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EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE
FEDERAL AND ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONS:
A CONTRAST IN UNEQUAL TREATMENT
Sidney Z. Karasik*
The United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee citizens equal
protection under the laws, but do not afford precisely the same measure of
protection. In this Article, Mr. Karasik compares the limited value of the
federal and Illinois equal protection clauses as grounds for challenging
discriminatory legislation with the greater efficacy of attacks under Illi-
nois' special legislation prohibition. He then criticizes a number of recent
Illinois Supreme Court decisions that deviate from Illinois' unique equal
protection perspective by applying a less exacting standard of review to
laws attacked as unconstitutional special legislation. He urges the supreme
court to return to its traditional, strict equal protection standards to ensure
more meaningful review of arbitrary Illinois legislative classifications.
In the arsenal of constitutional weapons designed to attack legislation, the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause has been neither as fre-
quently nor as successfully deployed as its due process counterpart.' In a
metaphorical sense, if due process has been a rifle, federal equal protection
has been merely a handgun-deadly only within a limited range. Indeed,
Justice Holmes once characterized the equal protection clause as "the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments,"2 reflecting the doctrine's narrow
appeal to the courts. With so little utility, it is not surprising that myriad
legislative classifications have survived challenges predicated on federal
equal protection claims of governmental discrimination.'
* Attorney, Chicago, Illinois; A.B., J.D., University of Chicago. Mr. Karasik is currently a
member of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee and was a co-founder and past president
of the Illinois Appellate Lawyers Association.
1. The Supreme Court generally has preferred due process rather than equal protection
grounds when invalidating statutes. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (while equal protection claims are often asserted but
rarely sustained, the due process clause is frequently used to strike down municipal laws). This
preference is illustrated by the Court's willingness to rely upon the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments' due process clauses to provide equal protection in situations just as easily treated under
the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (discrimina-
tion that denied indigents access to the judicial system violated fourteenth amendment due
process clause); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (denying admission to public school solely
on racial grounds contravened due process guarantee of the fifth amendment). The Illinois
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has been more willing to use the equal protection clause. See,
e.g., Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 11. 179, 194, 106 N.E.2d 124, 132 (although due
process and equal protection overlap, their spheres of protection are not coterminous; the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws extends beyond the requirements of due process), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
3. See notes 11-13 & 16 and accompanying text infra. "It is clear that the demand for
equal protection cannot be a demand that laws apply universally to all persons .... But [the
Constitution] does require, in its concern for equality, that those similarly situated be similarly
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Given the restricted usefulness of federal equal protection theory, equal
protection under the Illinois Constitution becomes especially important to
those attacking discriminatory Illinois laws. This Article reviews the histori-
cal evolution of federal and Illinois equal protection doctrine. It next exam-
ines certain contrasts between them and explains why Illinois' special equal
protection perspective is not repugnant to the federal view. After presenting
these well-recognized distinctions, it then criticizes a number of recent Illi-
nois Supreme Court decisions that either obscure the significant differences
between federal and Illinois equal protection or that carelessly misstate
fundamental equal protection principles. Finally, it concludes that the Illi-
nois Supreme Court should return to its well-established, activist role in
reviewing state legislation under Illinois' strict constitutional standards.
EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Federal equal protection historically is rooted in the conflict between the
states. Adopted after the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment's protections
were originally recognized by the Supreme Court as primarily intended to
benefit the newly freed slaves.' The amendment became the matrix of fu-
ture civil rights statutes 5 and a lock against repeal of the former slaves' hard
fought freedom.6 During the amendment's 110 year history, the Supreme
Court has extended fourteenth amendment protection further, and its analy-
sis of equal protection claims has seen two primary stages.
treated." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rev. 341, 343-44
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek]. In essence, Tussman and tenBroek indicated
that discrimination per se is not unconstitutional; only invidious discrimination is forbidden.
See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (discrimination per se not considered
unreasonable; only invidious discrimination prohibited).
4. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court stated "that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the
colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, . . . no discrimina-
tion shall be made against them because of their color." Id. at 307 (emphasis added). Although
Strauder involved discrimination against blacks, the Supreme Court has readily found classifica-
tions resting on race and ancestry suspect. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(fourteenth amendment is not directed solely against discrimination based upon differences be-
tween whites and blacks, but also protects persons of Mexican descent); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (fourteenth amendment's protections extend to those of Chinese descent).
5. Soon after the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871,
and 1875. These statutes were designed to protect the civil rights of the freed slaves, but many
of their provisions were struck down by the Supreme Court or repealed by Congress. See R.
CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 35-47 (1947). Today, civil
rights are preserved by certain criminal and civil sections of the United States Code. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1976) (criminal); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(3) (1976) (civil).
6. Along with the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments, the fourteenth amendment guar-
anteed that the newly acquired rights of blacks would not be rescinded. The amendment effect-
ively overruled the infamous decision of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
where the Supreme Court construed the Constitution to grant citizenship only to the residents of
states and not to blacks. In addition, the fourteenth amendment established national su-
premacy. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-2, at 416-17 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
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Under the "old" equal protection,7 judicial intervention was virtually un-
known outside racial discrimination cases.' The Supreme Court's initial re-
sponse was to allow state statutes to treat classes of citizens differently if the
legislature's classifications were merely "rationally related" to statutory
purposes.' This minimal test of "rational relationship" or "reasonablc basis"
was formulated early in the Court's efforts to define the reach of the four-
teenth amendment. 10
While racial classifications were carefully scrutinized because of their
direct relationship to the fourteenth amendment's purpose, non-racial legis-
lative classifications generally were upheld under the reasonable basis stand-
ard." During the "old" equal protection period, the Supreme Court pre-
ferred a deferential, non-interventionist posture unless classifications were
7. Professor Gunther labeled the pre-Warren approach "old" equal protection. See G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (10th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as GUNTHER].
8. See note 12 infra.
9. See, e.g., Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). In Ellis, a
railroad claimed that a law granting attorney's fees to all successful plaintiffs except railroads
violated equal protection. The Ellis Court agreed, but noted:
It is apparent that the mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute
from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that in all
cases it must appear not only that a classification has been made, but also that it is
one based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and
proper relation to the attempted classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selec-
tion.
Id. at 165-66.
10. One case in which the Supreme Court articulated the "old" equal protection approach
was Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), where it stated that:
The rules by which [equal protection] contention[s] must be tested, as is shown
by repeated decision of this court, are these: 1. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in
that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis
and is therefore purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classifica-
tion in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such law
must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis,
but is essentially arbitrary.
Id. at 78-79. Accord, Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (different treatment must be based upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of the regulation). Professor Gunther has noted that the 'old' variety of
equal protection focused solely on the means used by the legislature; it insisted merely that the
classification in the statute reasonably relate to the legislative purpose." GUNTHER, supra note 7,
at 670.
11. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (ordinance pro-
hibiting advertising on trucks not unreasonable); Brown-Foreman v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563
(1910) (license tax on liquor distillers not arbitrary or capricious). See generally Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 3, at 341, 344-53. See also TRIBE, supra note 6, at 994-95.
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drawn along patently racial lines. 2 Thus, a vast realm of non-racial classifi-
cations pertaining to property, social, and economic regulations were invari-
ably judged to be legitimate exercises of state police power under the reason-
able basis test.13
The Warren Court adopted a markedly more interventionist approach to
equal protection.' 4 That Court's now familiar "two-tier" test divided legis-
lative classifications into one of two levels and then applied the chosen level's
standard of review. Depending upon the level selected, statutes in virtually
all cases were either automatically sustained or automatically invalidated. 5
12. Until about 1905, the Supreme Court routinely sustained economic and police power
classifications against equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657
(1893) (statute imposing license requirement and tax on persons selling liquor upheld); Bell's Gap
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890) (tax law basing assessments upon face value rather
than actual value of bonds upheld); Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886)
(tax on foreign but not domestic corporations upheld). From 1905 to approximately 1937,
however, the Court temporarily abandoned its deferential view of economic regulations and
struck down such statutes. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison,
301 U.S. 459 (1937) (statute forbidding stock companies from acting through salaried employees
but permitting mutual companies to do so violated equal protection); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (state tax imposed on gross receipts of foreign and domestic
corporations but not on receipts of individuals or partnerships in same business violated equal
protection); Air-Way Elec. Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71 (1924) (statutory franchise tax
only on foreign corporations violated equal protection); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400
(1910) (statute establishing larger franchise tax for foreign corporations than for domestic
corporations violated equal protection). Other decisions during this period, now known as the
"'Lochner" era, relied upon the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to invalidate eco-
nomic and regulatory statutes. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (statute prohibit-
ing employers from compelling employees to sign anti-union employment contracts violated due
process); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal law forbidding anti-union employ-
ment contracts for interstate railroad's employees violated due process); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (statute limiting the number of hours bakery employees could work per day
and per week violated due process). The Lochner era decisions were greatly criticized and, after
1937, the Supreme Court invariably approved economic and regulatory statutes, with the
exception of Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), which was recently overruled in City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (rejecting an equal protection chal-
lenge to a Michigan statute that prohibited a woman from obtaining a bartenders license unless
she was the wife or daughter of a male tavern owner); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a Louisiana law requiring
certified pilots on ships traveling the Mississippi River, even though the certification application
was admitted to be intentionally discriminatory). See generally GUNTHER, supra note 7, at 670.
14. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther, Newer
Equal Protection]. Professor Gunther was the first to recognize the emerging distinction between
the "old" equal protection and the Warren Court's "new" equal protection analysis. He noted
that "[t]he emergence of the 'new' equal protection during the Warren Court's last decade
brought a dramatic change. . . . The familiar signals of 'suspect classification' and 'fundamental
interest' came to trigger the occasions for a new interventionist stance." See Gunther, Newer
Equal Protection, supra, at 8. See also GUNTHER, supra note 7, at 671; Note, Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
15. Professor Gunther described this mechanical approach as "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact." See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 8. See note 26 and accompanying
text infra.
1981] A CONTRAST IN UNEQUAL TREATMENT 267
The "two-tier" test's lower level was little more than a new name for the
"old," deferential equal protection analysis. It subjected the challenged stat-
ute to minimal scrutiny, requiring judicial intervention only if the classifica-
tion was arbitrary or unreasonable. 16 As a practical matter, statutes rele-
gated to the bottom tier were always approved, 7 even if mere conjecture by
the Court was necessary to supply the legislative rationale underlying a
particular category.18  Economic and police power regulations chronically
have been well-recognized bottom-tier candidates.19
The "top-tier," however, reflected a considerable departure from any pre-
vious equal protection standard. It expanded the early racial classification
cases into a full-fledged "tier," thereby exposing a new category of legislation
to constitutional attack. This expansion was accomplished by viewing race as
simply a subset of a larger category of "suspect classes"' deserving of four-
16. The lower tier's minimum rationality standard is satisfied when statutory classifications
are rationally related to the statute's purpose. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co.,
__ U.S. __ , 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981) (statute banning retail sale.of milk in plastic
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sales in other nonreturnable, non-
refillable containers, held "fully supportable under [Court's equal protection] precedents" in
economic sphere); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (statute
excluding prisoners awaiting trial from those eligible to vote with absentee ballots was reason-
able); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960) (statute permitting the sale of certain
merchandise by some merchants but not others was rationally and sulIstantially related to the
legislation's purpose); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (statute prohibiting
those without an optometrist or ophthalmologist's license from providing various services relat-
ing to eye glasses was rationally related to the law's objectives). See also Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). The same reasonable basis
or rational relationship test was employed under the "old" equal protection. See GUNTHER, supra
note 7, at 670-71.
17. Professor Turkington observed that "[i]n terms of substantive limitations on economic
regulations, it is a fact that only one exercise of police power at the state and federal level has
been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court solely on substantive economic due process
or equal protection grounds since 1937." Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois,
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385, 410 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Turkington]. The sole exception is
Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427, U.S. 297
(1976), where the Court invalidated a statute that exempted one company from regulations
applying to all other companies engaged in the currency exchange business.
18. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 530 (1959); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552
(1947). The Court's willingness to sustain classifications when any state of facts could conceiv-
ably support statutory distinctions prompted one authority to comment:
This remarkable deference to state objectives has operated in the sphere of econo-
mic regulation quite apart from whether the conceivable "state of facts" (1) actually
exists, (2) would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has ever
been urged in the classification's defense by those who either promulgated it or
have argued in its support: Often only the Court's imagination has limited the
allowable purposes ascribed to government.
TRIBE, supra note 6, at 996.
19. See note 16 supra.
20. The Supreme Court first explicitly referred to race as "suspect" in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See GUNTHER, supra note 7, at 745; TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1013.
In his famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Justice
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teenth amendment protection. For example, alienage 2' and national origin"2
eventually joined race as "suspect classes" and were afforded "top-tier" sta-
tus. Later, the Court extended this stricter standard of review to so-called
"fundamental rights," such as the rights to vote,2' to travel,24 and to marry.'
The key difference between bottom and top-tier analysis is, of course, the
degree of scrutiny. Unlike the highly deferential lower-tier test of minimum
rationality or reasonable basis, the upper-tier triggers a strict scrutiny stan-
dard under which any statute impinging on a suspect class or fundamental
right violates equal protection absent a compelling state interest in the clas-
sification. Only a few statutes have survived strict scrutiny. 21
In recent years, some members of the Court have become dissatisfied
with the rigid, predictable results of "two-tier" analysis.2 1 Preferring a more
Stone suggested that some non-racial classifications could also merit exacting scrutiny if they
tended to restrict the political processes which usually bring about the repeal of undesirable
legislation. He speculated whether "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry." id. at 152-53 n.4.
21. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (state classifications based on alienage
are inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (alienage granted suspect classification status; therefore state cannot constitutionally
deny welfare benefits to resident aliens). This standard has not always adhered, and appears to
have been abrogated recently when a governmental function is involved. See Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (state statute prohibiting aliens from teaching tested under rational
basis standard); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (mere rational basis required when state
barred employment of aliens as state troopers).
22. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
23. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (because voting is fundamental right,
law limiting voting to persons who resided in state for one year held unconstitutional under
equal protection); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting declared
fundamental right; therefore, denial of right to vote in state elections for failure to pay poll tax
held unconstitutional under equal protection).
24. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (Arizona law re-
quiring one year residence in county as condition for receipt of free medical care held unconsti-
tutional restriction on the fundamental right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1968) (limitation of welfare benefits to those who resided in a state for at least one year held
unconstitutional restraint on fundamental right to travel).
25. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental; there-
fore, state law forbidding a person to marry when that person has unfulfilled obligations to
support a minor child not in his or her custody held unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage declared a basic civil right, fundamental to existence and survival; Court
therefore invalidated a state statute forbidding interracial marriage).
26. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (federal ceiling on political campaign
contribution upheld); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (fifty days residency requirement
for voters upheld); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (same); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese American's conviction for violating a World War II military order
excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast areas upheld).
27. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (two tier approach not suited to sophisticated equal protection inquiry);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (two tier view "does not
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flexible approach, several justices have suggested a "three-tier" or "multiple-
tier" analysis that would permit more meaningful review of statutes falling
somewhere between the bottom and top tiers of the "two-tier" system .28 This
emerging analytical framework, a hybrid of the Warren Court's "two-tier"
position, 29 has been termed "newer" equal protection by one commenta-
tor. 30  It represents the Court's attempt to use the fourteenth amendment as
the basis for some judicial activism while avoiding the confining language of
strict scrutiny associated with the Warren Court's new equal protection.
The "newer" equal protection applies an intermediate scrutiny test that
falls somewhere between the strict and minimal scrutiny standards. In-
termediate scrutiny requires legislative classifications to be substantially re-
lated to an important state interest 3' before they can be constitutionally
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases"); Id. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring)
(valid reasons exist for dissatisfaction with the two-tier approach); Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring) (the Court in fact employs a "spectrum of standards");
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(same view as expressed in his dissent in Murgia).
28. For example, in his dissent in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98
(1973), Justice Marshall criticized the Court's "rigidified approach to equal protection analysis,"
id., contending that in fact the Court's decisions were applying a "spectrum of standards" that
"clearly comprehends variations in degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular
classifications, depending ... on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn." Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has indicated that
he views the two-tier approach as less than completely logical and that, in reality, the Supreme
Court has employed that approach "to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in
a reasonably consistent fashion." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell has admitted that the Court's decisions concerning gender based classifica-
tions have engaged in "more critical examination than is normally applied when 'fundamental'
constitutional rights and 'suspect classes' are not present ... ," id., but has expressly disapproved
of the label "middle-tier" as a proper characterization of the Court's equal protection analysis for
cases falling between the upper and lower tiers. Id. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring). See
generally Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 14; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson].
29. For scholarly commentary on this emerging equal protection approach, see Barrett,
Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protec-
tion Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classification, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974);
Wilkinson, supra note 28.
30. See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 12.
31. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (congressional reliance on racial
and ethnic criteria as a condition to receiving federal grant for voluntary affirmative action
programs sustained after a "close" and "searching" examination); Wengler v. Druggists Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (statute requiring widowers but not widows to prove dependency
on spouse to receive death benefits not substantially related to an important state goal); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute which required illegitimate children to provide proof of
paternity to inherit from father by intestate succession substantially related to important state
interests); University of Cal. Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (state's "legitimate
and substantial interest" in ameliorating effects of past discrimination were insufficient to sustain
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approved. Minimal scrutiny, on the other hand, merely requires that legisla-
tive means be rationally related to statutory ends, and strict scrutiny focuses
on whether the legislative classification's ultimate objective furthers a coin-
pelling state interest. At present, however, intermediate scrutiny has not
been explicitly adopted by a majority of the Court ' and its range of applica-
bility is uncertain. Thus, the Warren Court's "two-tier" approach retains
much of its vitality, at least in name, if not in practice.
Under contemporary federal equal protection, then, statutory classifica-
tions typically receive judical deference to the point of non-review, unless a
suspect class or fundamental right is involved. Absent a suspect class or
fundamental right, a legislative category needs only a reasonable basis to
pass equal protection muster, a minimal hurdle. A remarkably different pro-
file, however, emerges from a long line of Illinois cases in which numerous
statutes and ordinances have not withstood equal protection challenges-
even when the sole ground for invalidation was the unreasonableness of the
statutory scheme. The significance of this federal/Illinois dichotomy becomes
clear through a review of Illinois' unusual equal protection stance.
ILLINOIS EQUAL PROTECTION
A Tradition Against Special Laws for Special Classes
Although state courts often articulate homage to legislative judgment
under some deferential standard similar to the federal approach, Illinois
courts have not hesitated to strike down scores of arbitrary or irrational Illi-
nois statutory classifications. Illinois' departure from federal equal protection
standards can be explained partly by its political history and partly by cer-
tain provisions in the Illinois Constitutions of 1870 and 1970. Although dif-
ferences exist between federal and Illinois equal protection, the two
approaches are not repugnant.
Before 1970, the Illinois Constitution lacked an explicit equal protection
clause.33 Its absence, however, did not hinder Illinois' development of a
venerable equal protection tradition. Illinois courts remedied the omission
by treating the 1870 Illinois Constitution's due process and special
legislation ' provisions as functional equivalents of equal protection.
special admissions program favoring minorities); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property
tax exemption for widows but not widowers upheld because statutory classifications had "fair
and substantial relation" to the subject of the legislation).
32. See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 17-18.
33. Illinois was only the eighth state to include an equal protection clause in its constitution.
Most states, however, compensated for this constitutional defect by expanding other provisions,
most commonly the due process clause. Grad, The State Bill of Rights, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 30, 35 (V. Ranney ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Grad].
34. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 2. Illinois decisions implied equal protection standards
into the due process clause. See, e.g., Fiorito v. Jones, 39 111. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968);
Marallis v. City of Chicago, 349 IIl. 422, 182 N.E. 394 (1932); People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136
N.E. 505 (1922).
35. Ill. Const. of 1870, art. IV, § 22. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text infra.
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Much like the federal equal protection clause, the Illinois ban on special 3
and loca 3 7 laws arose from post-Civil War political pressure. Following the
war, partisan politics was the norm in Springfield, with special interest
groups and corporations able to secure favorable legislation. 3 Strong public
reaction against such legislative abuse occasioned the 1870 constitutional
restriction on special and local legislation,39 which applied to twenty-three
enumerated categories. 40  In general terms, the special legislation clause
36. A special law is one which applies only to a portion of the state's people, institutions or
economy. This distinction is not geographically based. G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 207 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
BRADEN & COHN]. See, e.g., Noel v. People, 187 Il. 587, 58 N.E. 616 (1900) (statute prohibit-
ing home remedies by anyone except registered pharmacists was special legislation); Millikan v.
Jensen, 4 I1. App. 3d 580, 281 N.E.2d 401 (3d Dist. 1972) (statute banning dancing on Sunday
but not other forms of entertainment was special legislation).
37. A local law is one which applies only to a portion of the state and its government.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 206. See, e.g., In re Struck, 41 111. 2d 574, 244 N.E.2d 176
(1969) (statute which established a procedure for recalling elective officials under a commission
form of municipal government but which provided no similar procedure for city council govern-
ments was an invalid local law); Kremers v. City of West Chicago, 406 Ill. 546, 94 N.E.2d 337
(1950) (statute placing a maximum ceiling on library building fund tax rates for towns within
counties of certain populations was invalid local legislation).
38. Indeed, by 1869 special laws filled four volumes totaling 3,350 pages.
39. See BRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 204-05; J. CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN
ILLINOIS, 1818-1970, at 67-68 (1972); Cove & Carlson, The Legislature, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 101, 105 (V. Ranney ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Cove & Carlson]. The 1818 Constitution contained no prohibition on special or local legislation.
BIRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 204. The 1848 Constitution touched on the problem of special
legislation by requiring extensive procedural formalities before a bill could be passed. By 1862,
delegates to that convention proposed several bans on special legislation, notably in the area of
corporate charters. This constitution, however, was never approved. J. CORNELIUS, CONSTITU-
TION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970, at 34, 50-51 (1972).
The prohibition against special legislation adopted eight years later was designed to solve
four problems. The clause was intended: (1) to prevent the legislature from spending its time on
local matters and ignoring statewide concerns; (2) to prevent influence from special interest
groups and the attendent corruption; (3) to prevent hard-to-remove vested rights from forming;
and (4) to prevent the intrusion of the state into local problems. Cove & Carlson, supra, at 106.
40. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22 provided:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases, that is to say: For-(1) Granting divorces; (2) Changing the
names of persons or places; (3) Laying out, opening, altering and working roads or
highways; (4) Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds; (5)
Locating or changing county seats; (6) Regulating county and township affairs; (7)
Regulating the practice in courts of justice; (8) Regulating the jurisdiction and duties
of justices of the peace, police magistrates, and constables; (9) Providing for changes
of venue in civil and criminal cases; (10) Incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or
changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village; (11) Providing for the
election of members of the board of supervisors in townships, incorporated towns or
cities; (12) Summoning and impaneling grand or petit juries; (13) Providing for the
management of common schools; (14) Regulating the rate of interest on money; (15)
The opening and conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting; (16)
The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors or others under disability;
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prohibited "granting to any corporation, association or individual any spe-
cial or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.
' 4
'
Commentators 42 and the Illinois Supreme Court 43 regarded the 1870 pro-
hibition against special laws as "supplementing" the federal equal protection
clause. Representative Illinois decisions held unconstitutional laws governing
civil procedure,4 4 taxes, 45 licensing, 46 voting, 47 and health regulations, 48 al-
though special legislation cases covered almost the entire range of govern-
mental activity. 49 In many of these pre-1970 opinions, the Illinois Supreme
(17) The protection of game or fish; (18) Chartering or licensing ferries or toll
bridges; (19) Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures; (20) Creating, increasing, or
decreasing fees, percentages or allowances of public officers, during the term for
which said officers are elected or appointed; (21) Changing the law of descent; (22)
Granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad
tracks, or amending existing charters for such purposes; (23) Granting to any cor-
poration, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
franchise whatever. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable,
no special law shall be enacted.
41. Id.
42. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 221; Cove & Carlson, supra note 39, at 108; Grad,
supra note 33, at 41-42.
43. See, e.g., Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 I11, 179, 194, 106 N.E.2d 124, 132, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); Schuman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 407 Ill. 313, 317, 95 N.E,2d
447, 449-50 (1950); Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 358 I11. 575, 585, 193
N.E. 662, 666 (1934); Marallis v. City of Chicago, 349 I11. 422, 427, 182 N.E. 394, 396 (1932).
44. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (statute of limitations re-
stricting architect malpractice cases to four years from date of act was invalid because it did not
apply to other construction professionals); Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 65, 203
N.E.2d 573, 576 (1966) (statute exempting park districts from tort liability unconstitutional on
special legislation grounds); Funkhouser v, Randolph, 287 Ill. 94, 122 N.E. 144 (1919) (statute
allowing only plaintiffs to seek appellate review of adverse findings of fact was invalid);
Manowsky v. Stephan, 233 I11. 409, 84 N.E. 365 (1908) (law which allowed only mechanics
lienholders to obtain legal fees was invalid).
45. People ex rel. Toman v. Chicago Union Station Co., 383 I11. 153, 48 N.E.2d 524 (1943)
(equal protection was denied when appellant's property was not assessed on the same basis as
all other property in taxing district); People ex rel. Clarke v. Jareki, 363 I11. 180, 1 N.E.2d 855
(1936) (special installment tax payment plan for counties of over 500,000 persons was invalid);
People ex rel. Stuckhart v. Knopf, 183 I11, 410, 56 N.E. 155 (1900) (law limiting smaller coun-
ties' taxing rates was invalid).
46. People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950) (statute requiring licensed plumb-
ers to apprentice under a master plumber was unconstitutional); City of Elgin v. Winchester,
300 I11. 214, 133 N.E. 205 (1921) (ordinance requiring only non-residents to pay for handbill
distribution licenses was invalid).
47. Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 I11. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955) (statute
requiring employers to allow employees to leave work to vote while being paid was invalid);
Grennan v. Sheldon, 401 Ill. 351, 82 N.E.2d 162 (1948) (special voting canvasses for areas
outside municipal boundaries were unconstitutional).
48. People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N.E. 994 (1913) (statute preventing the operation
of emery wheels in all basements was invalid); Starne v. People, 222 Ill. 189, 78 N.E. 61 (1906)
(law requiring coal mine owners to provide wash houses for their employees was unconstitu-
tional); Bailey v. People, 190 I11. 28, 60 N.E. 98 (1901) (ordinance making it unlawful for more
than six persons to occupy one room in a lodging house was invalid).
49. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 206.
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Court used the federal equal protection and Illinois special legislation clauses
interchangeably to strike down statutes or ordinances as unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious.50
In 1970, the constitutional convention adopted a revised special legislation
prohibition.' The new provision retained the same general principle5 but
eliminated the much criticized "laundry list" of explicitly forbidden
legislation."3 The convention delegates also added a clause specifically
empowering the courts to determine whether a general law could or should
be made applicable when statutory classifications are questioned."4 This
subtle transfer of legislative power to the judiciary' went virtually unnoticed
by constitutional delegates. 5'
The convention members also failed to perceive the significance of the
equal protection clause they adopted. 57  Concerned more with efforts of
anti-abortion proponents to extend due process protection to unborn chil-
dren, delegates approved the new equal protection measure almost without
debate. 58 Similarly, the Bill of Rights committee report only briefly dis-
cussed the equal protection provision, viewing it simply as a formal, clear
and complete 59 expression of Illinois' well-established special legislation re-
50. See Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 42 Ill..2d 265, 267, 247
N.E.2d 603, 605 (1969) (statute relieving railroads of their liability for accidents was unreason-
able); Begich v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 111. 2d 32, 36, 245 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1969) (statute basing
damages on whether a body member was lost traumatically or through surgical necessity was
arbitrary); People ex rel. Harding v. Chicago & N.W. Ry, 340 Ill. 102, 110, 172 N.E. 13, 16
(1930) (statute which allowed school districts in larger counties to assess an additional school tax
was arbitrary); People ex rel. Hoeinghaus v. Campbell, 285 Ill. 557, 563, 121 N.E. 183, 185
(1918) (statute making it easier for smaller areas to incorporate into towns or cities was unreason-
able); Jones v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 231 I11. 302, 309, 83 N.E. 215, 217 (1907) (statute
limiting review of appellate court decisions only for the appellee was arbitrary).
51. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local
law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination."
52. IV SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REcoRD OF PROCEEDINGs 2707 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as RECORD].
53. Many commentators urged the delegates to eliminate the twenty-three explicit prohibi-
tions. VI REC ORD, supra note 52, at 1394; BRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 225; Gove &
Carlson, supra note 39, at 107. By eliminating the laundry list, the convention delegates
intended to make the special legislation clause a more flexible provision. They did not intend to
allow special legislation in areas where it previously had been forbidden. IV RECORD, supra note
52, at 2708-09.
54. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
55. See notes 100-102 and accompanying text infra.
56. See IV RECORD, supra note 52, at 2707-09 (the entire debate on art. IV, § 13).
57. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides: "No person shall ... be denied the equal protection of
the laws."
58. III RECORD, supra note 52, at 1496-1523. A few convention members briefly noted that
the proposed equal protection clause would be the first of its kind in Illinois, but only Delegate
Arthur Lennon discussed the new clause's implications beyond the abortion context, and his
remarks consisted of only two paragraphs in the convention transcript. Id. at 1499.
59. Id.
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striction. ° The committee's failure to note the equal protection-special
legislation distinction was not surprising since their research staff also over-
looked it.6'
As if this double-barreled approach was not sufficient to ensure equal
protection, for good measure the convention also equipped the constitution
with supplementary prohibitions against discrimination in employment,6" in
the sale or rental of property, 3 on the basis of sex,6 4 or on account of physical
or mental handicaps.6 5  These specific restrictions, along with the more
general equal protection and special legislation clauses, amply demonstrate
Illinois' strong commitment to equal protection in the 1970 constitution.
These measures did not create new constitutional doctrine, but rather reaf-
firmed and expanded Illinois' long-standing equal protection heritage.
Deference in Reverse: From Legislature to judiciary
The evolution of the constitution's language suggests Illinois' special treat-
ment of equal protection and Illinois decisions confirm the contrast between
Illinois and federal equal protection. Both before and after the 1970 constitu-
tion, Illinois courts have exhibited markedly less deference to legislative
discretion than have federal courts. Indeed, the Illinois judiciary's activist
approach could aptly be termed "deference in reverse."
Illinois, of course, has emulated federal standards in appropriate cases
involving fundamental rights or suspect classes. 6 These categories have
received strict scrutiny just as they would under the federal model. 7 But in
"bottom-tier" cases concerning property, contract, or other economic classi-
fications, Illinois has departed from the deferential federal "rationality" test
that countenances nearly all such legislative categories.68
60. VI RECORo, supra note 52, at 18-19.
61. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 36, at 225; Gove & Carlson, supra note 39, at 108; Grad,
supra note 33, at 41-42.
62. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 18.
65. Id. § 19.
66. See, e.g., People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 111. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469
(1975) (alienage is a suspect classification; interstate travel is a fundamental right).
67. See, e.g., Canhmann v. Eckerty, 40 Ill. App. 3d 180, 351 N.E.2d 580 (4th Dist. 1976)
(right to travel and right to vote are fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis);
People v. Williams, 32 11. App. 3d 547, 336 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1975) (statutory classification
based solely on sex is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny). Cf. In re Roger B, 84 Ill. 2d
323, 418 N.E.2d 751 (1981) (status of an adoptee under the Illinois Adoption Act does not create
a suspect classification).
68. In contrast to the federal decisions, numerous property, contract, and economic classi-
fications have been invalidated by the Illinois courts as obnoxious to the strict Illinois equal
protection standards. See, e.g., Frost v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 30 I11. 2d 241, 195 N.E.2d 616
(1964) (zoning ordinance which excluded drive-in restaurants from districts in which fully en-
closed restaurants were permitted, was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious); Ronda Realty
Corp. v. Lawton, 414 I11. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310 (1953) (zoning ordinance requiring apartment
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A classic example of Illinois' lack of judicial deference is Grasse v. Dealer's
Transport Co. ,' a watershed in Illinois jurisprudence. In Grasse, the Illinois
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a provision of the Worker's Com-
pensation Act which restricted third parties' tort liability for negligently
injuring employees. 70  Relying upon both the federal equal protection clause
and Illinois' special legislation prohibition, the Grasse court held that the
statutory classification conditioning employees' recovery on whether third
party tortfeasors happened to be covered by the compensation act was
impermissible. 7
1
Aside from the large volume of third party litigation generated by Grasse,
the case is notable for its characteristically Illinois approach to equal protec-
tion. Instead of presuming legislative reasonableness and validity, the court
subtly shifted the burden of such proof to the legislation's proponents. While
recognizing that the legislature has wide discretion in constructing "classifi-
cations to subserve public objects" 72 and that "perfect uniformity of treat-
ment of all persons is neither practical nor desirable," 73 the supreme court
nevertheless invalidated the statute as "arbitrary. '74  This conclusion was
reached after reviewing, inter alia, the federal "rationality" test under which
federal courts had invariably sustained police power classifications. 75 Thus,
Grasse demonstrates the willingness of Illinois courts to strike down police
power legislation if it is merely "arbitrary," a rare result in federal deci-
sions. 76
buildings to provide parking facilities in ratio to number of apartments, but containing no simi-
lar provisions as to hotels, boarding houses and similar structures, violated equal protection);
Agnew v. Woodruff & Edwards Inc., 365 Il. 384, 6 N.E.2d 623 (1937) (statute prohibiting
certain hazardous occupations from being conducted below ground, but allowing such activities
to continue above ground, held unconstitutional as unlawfully discriminating between persons
similarly situated); Marallis v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N.E. 394 (1932) (statute permit-
ting honorably discharged servicemen to peddle goods without a license violated equal protec-
tion); Josma v. Western Steel Car & Foundry Co., 249 Ill. 508, 94 N.E. 945 (1911) (employ-
ment statute which imposed a different measure of liability on employers who hired workmen
from out of state violated equal protection).
69. 412 I11. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
70. 412 Il. at 199, 106 N.E.2d at 135.
71. Id. at 200, 106 N.E.2d at 135.
72. Id. at 193, 106 N.E.2d at 132.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 200, 106 N.E.2d at 135.
75. The Grasse court reiterated the federal rationality test, but ultimately interpreted it in
light of strict Illinois equal protection standards. The court stated:
For these classifications to be deemed constitutional . . . it must appear that the
particular classification is based upon some real and substantial difference in kind,
situation or circumstance in the persons or objects on which the classification rests,
and which bears a rational relation to the evil to be remedied .. .otherwise the
classification will be deemed arbitrary ....
Id. at 193-94, 106 N.E.2d at 132 (emphasis added).
76. In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), Justice Marshall
analyzed the Court's mechanistic two-tier approach to equal protection. Comparing the top and
bottom tiers of the federal equal protection approach, Marshall stated:
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Further illustrating Illinois' "strict" rationality test is another worker's
compensation case, Begich v. Industrial Commission.7" The challenged stat-
ute differentiated between persons suffering traumatic loss of appendages
and those suffering such loss through surgical necessity. 7  After invoking the
federal equal protection clause and Illinois' special legislation restriction, the
court strictly applied the "rational basis" test and found the traumatic-surgi-
cal loss distinction "arbitrary and unreasonable." '' Quite clearly, the high
court exhibited no judicial deference to the legislature's judgment that trau-
matic and surgical amputations differ markedly. 80
The dramatic difference between the slight scrutiny or liberal deference of
the federal rationality standard and Illinois equal protection's strict rational-
ity standard is perhaps best demonstrated by Sunday closing cases. In
McGowan v. Maryland,"1 the United States Supreme Court relied upon tra-
ditional, permissive standards in sustaining a Maryland Sunday closing law
even though the statute affected only some businesses."5 The statute's
If a statute invades a "fundamental" right or discriminates against a "suspect" class,
it is subject to strict scrutiny. If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute
always, or nearly always .... is struck down .....
But however understandable the Court's hesitancy to invoke strict scrutiny, all
remaining legislation should not drop into the bottom tier, and be measured by the
mere rationality test. For that test, too, when applied as articulated, leaves little
doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld.
Id. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
77. 42 Il. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969). For an example of the strict rationality standard in
the criminal law context see People v. McCarty, 93 Ill. App. 3d 898, 418 N.E.2d 26 (4th Dist.
1981) (classification of cocaine as a "narcotic drug" under the Illinois Controlled Substance Act
was not "rational" and thus violative of United States and Illinois Constitutions).
78. The statute read in relevant part:
When an accidental injury sustained is limited to a hand and results in the amputa-
tion thereof, and such amputation is performed at the point of election on the
forearm for the purpose of permitting the use of an artificial member, such injury
shall be compensated as the loss of a hand.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(e)(9) (1967).
79. 42 Ill. 2d at 36-37, 245 N.E.2d at 459.
80. Justice House recognized the majority's failure to give due deference to legislative judg-
ment, especially in the area of Worker's Compensation. In dissent, he argued:
How can we interfere with the legislative judgment as to the comparative serious-
ness of loss of a hand as compared to the loss of an arm, or loss of sight to that of
hearing, or between both arms and both legs, or between sight and the extremities?
This opinion does just that.
42 I11. 2d at 39, 245 N.E.2d at 460 (House, J., dissenting).
81. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
82. The challenged statute prohibited all but certain exempted merchants from selling var-
ious types of merchandise on Sundays. Similar Sunday closing laws were upheld in other
Supreme Court decisions that year. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
MeGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (statute forbidding retailers to operate on Sundays but allowing
manufacturers and others to do so did not violate equal protection); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961) (statute prohibiting clothing and furniture retailers from operating on Sundays
but permitting other businesses to do so did not violate equal protection); Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (statute prohibiting some but not all
businesses from operating on Sundays did not violate equal protection).
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underinclusiveness was justified by the familiar "one-step-at-a-time"
rationale, "3 which affords legislatures wide discretion when classifying by
allowing them to correct perceived problems piecemeal rather than requir-
ing a comprehensive, uniform approach."
In contrast, Illinois courts have invalidated Sunday closing laws precisely
because they affected only some businesses.8 5 For example, in Courtesy
Motor Sales v. Ward,88 a statute prohibited the sale of automobiles on
Sunday but imposed no similar restrictions on other businesses.8 7  The
owners of a car dealership argued that the statute violated federal equal
protection and Illinois' special legislation prohibition.88 The Illinois Su-
preme Court agreed and struck down the statute on special legislation
grounds, reasoning that the statute arbitrarily and impermissibly singled out
the automobile business even though that business was not significantly
different from others permitted to operate on Sundays.89 Furthermore, a
later Illinois Supreme Court decision specifically rejected the "one-step-at-a-
time" rationale relied upon by the McGowan Court. 0 Thus, before 1970, it
was readily apparent that in the context of social, economic, and regulatory
laws Illinois' strict rationality approach to equal protection resulted in far
more judicial activism and much more meaningful scrutiny of legislative
classifications than the federal view.
Although Grasse, Begich, and Courtesy Motor Sales preceded the 1970
Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court continued its interventionist
approach to equal protection soon after the new constitution, with its revised
special legislation provision and new equal protection clause, was adopted.
In the seminal decision of Grace v. Howlett," the high court considered a
challenge to Illinois' first no-fault provision for auto insurance. By classifying
insurance coverage on the basis of various categories of motor vehicles and
their usage, the statute sought to compensate automobile accident victims
more efficiently." The act's classifications were attacked as violating the
83. 366 U.S. at 426 n.3 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). See
also Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981) ("[A] legislature
need not 'strike at all levels at the same time or in the same way.").
84. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 3, at 360.
85. See, e.g., Courtesy Motor Sales v. Ward, 24 Ill. 2d 82, 179 N.E.2d 692 (1962) (statute
prohibiting automobile sales on Sundays struck down); City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263 Ill. 531
(1914) (ordinance singling out barbers for Sunday closing was unconstitutional); Eden v. People,
161 111. 296 (1896) (same restriction contained in barber statute invalidated); Millikan v. Jensen,
4 11. App. 3d 580, 281 N.E.2d 401 (3d Dist. 1972) (ordinance forbidding persons from conduct-
ing public dances on Sunday but not prohibiting other businesses from operating struck down).
86. 24 111. 2d 82, 179 N.E.2d 692 (1962).
87. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 282 (1960).
88. 24 Ill. 2d at 84, 179 N.E.2d at 693.
89. Id. at 87, 179 N.E.2d at 694.
90. Grace v. Howlett, 51 I11. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
91. 51 11. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
92. The statute provided that every policy insuring against liability for
accidental bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the own-
ership, maintenance or use of any private passenger automobile registered or prin-
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federal and state equal protection clauses as well as Illinois' special legisla-
tion prohibition.'
Preferring to dispose of the equal protection contentions on special legisla-
tion grounds, the high court held the "no-fault" classification invalid because
it created special legislative treatment of certain motor vehicle users where a
general law could be made applicable. 4  In reaching this result, Justice
Schaefer observed that for the first time the 1970 Constitution included an
equal protection clause in addition to the familiar special legislation prohibi-
tion. 5  He also noted, however, that "while these two provisions ... cover
much of the same terrain, they are not duplicates." 6
Continuing his analysis, Justice Schaefer recognized that the 1970 consti-
tution "increased judicial responsibility for determining whether a general
law is or can be made applicable."-9 7  Taking a strong stance typical of
Illinois equal protection decisions, he forcefully stated:
Unless this court is to abdicate its constitutional responsibility to determine
whether a general law can be made applicable, the available scope for
legislative experimentation with special legislation is limited, and this
court cannot rule that the legislature is free to enact special legislation
simply because "reform may take one step at a time."98
Consistent with its constitutional mandate, the court strictly reviewed the
no-fault statute and held that it was invalid special legislation because it
limited tort recovery for some but not all classes of auto accident victims.,
cipally garaged in this State and insuring 5 or less private passenger automobiles,
must provide coverage affording payment of the following minimum benefits.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.150(a) (1971). It also provided a definition for "private passenger
automobile" in an attempt to clarify the inexact language of § 1065.150(a):
"[p]rivate passenger automobile" means a sedan, station wagon or jeep-type auto-
mobile not used as a public livery conveyance for passengers, nor rented to others,
and includes any other 4 wheel motor vehicle used as a utility automobile, pickup
truck, sedan delivery truck or panel truck which is not used primarily in the
occupation, profession or business of the insured.
Id. § 1065.150(c).
93. 51 111. 2d at 485, 283 N.E.2d at 478.
94. In holding the classification to be invalid, the court stated:
The constitutional test under section 13 of article IV is whether a general law can
be made applicable, and in this case that question nust receive an affirmative
answer.
There are many purposes for which the obvious differences between private pas-
senger automobile, buses, taxicabs, trucks and other vehicles would justify different
legislative treatment. But the determination of the amount to be recovered by per-
sons injured by those vehicles .. . is not one of those purposes.
Id. at 487, 283 N.E.2d'at 479.
95. Id. at 486-87, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
96. Id. at 487, 283 N.E.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 487-88, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
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In light of Grasse, Begich, Courtesy Motor Sales and Grace, it is apparent
that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized and accepted its crucial,
activist role in equal protection confrontations. Prior to 1970, special legisla-
tion issues generally were for the legislature to decide; the judiciary only
considered such questions when they arose under one of the 1870 Constitu-
tion's twenty-three special legislation categories.°10  Even if a challenged law
did not fall within one of these categories, the supreme court still intervened
when it concluded that no rational basis existed for special legislative treat-
ment, as the Grasse, Begich, and Courtesy Motor Sales decisions demon-
strate. Article IV, section 13 of the 1970 Constitution greatly expanded
judicial responsibility in special legislation contexts by establishing that such
questions "shall be a matter for judicial determination,"'' 0 1 a change clearly
understood and sanctioned by the Grace court. Thus, Illinois courts have a
well-established duty to invalidate special legislation, regardless of the de-
sires or motivations behind such enactments. 0 2  This shift of power from
legislature to judiciary therefore merits the label "deference in reverse."
Illinois' Special Legislation-Equal Protection Counterpoint
Although Illinois' equal protection clause and proscription against special
legislation "cover much of the same terrain," "3 there are significant differ-
ences in the protections afforded. An equal protection claim under the Illi-
nois Constitution activates the federal degrees-of-scrutiny test to determine
whether the challenged legislation invidiously discriminates. 1"" Under the
top-tier of the federal approach, inherently suspect or fundamental right
100. See note 40 supra. Prior to 1970, the rule had been firmly established by a long line of
cases, beginning with Owners of Lands v. People ex rel. Stookey, 113 111. 296, 315 (1885), soon
after the adoption of the 1870 Constitution. A number of decisions espoused this rule prior to
1970. See, e.g., People ex rel. Coutrakon v. Lohr, 9 I11. 2d 539, 549, 138 N.E.2d 471, 477
(1956); Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 547, 78 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1948); People v. Emerson,
323 Ill. 561, 563, 154 N.E. 474, 475 (1926).
101. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (emphasis added). In Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51111. 2d 103, 110,
281 N.E.2d 317, 321 (1972), the Illinois Supreme Court first recognized that art. IV, § 13 of the
1970 Constitution specifically rejected the rule that the determination of whether a general law
can be made applicable is for the legislature.
102. Many delegates to the 1969 Constitutional Convention believed increased judicial re-
sponsibility was desirable. This belief was based upon "optimism about judicial problem-solving
generated by the activism of the Warren Court [and] pessimism about the capacities of the other
institutions of government, particularly the General Assembly, to perform responsibly." See
Whalen & Wolff, Constitutional Law: The Prudence of Judicial Restraint Under the New
Illinois Constitution, 22 DFPAUL L. REV. 63 (1972).
103. Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d at 487, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
104. In Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 I11. 2d 116, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980), the
Illinois Supreme Court compared the equal protection standards of both Illinois and federal
courts. The court stated: "Under the traditional equal protection standards utilized by both the
Federal and State courts, a legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate legislative purpose." Id. at 121, 412 N.E.2d at 15:3. Before applying the
"rational relation" test, however, the court stated the issue of the case: "The question has thus
become whether the legislative classification created by the amendment is rationally related to
the purpose set forth in the original act." Id. at 122, 412 N.E.2d at 154.
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classifications trigger "strict scrutiny," which invariably results in
invalidation." On the other hand, the bottom tier's "minimal scrutiny" sig-
nals relaxed judicial review and gives legislative judgment a wide berth,
ultimately resulting in minimal protection of the laws.'06
By contrast, a special legislation claim does not involve degrees of judicial
scrutiny. Article IV, section 13 requires the courts to determine "whether a
general law is or can be made applicable" in place of a special law. This
judicial mandate precludes any passive, deferential attitude that is a compo-
nent of the federal "two-tier" view. Illinois courts thus have an affirmative
duty to determine whether a challenged statutory classification is impermis-
sibly arbitrary in contravening the constitutional interdiction against special
laws for special classes.
Although Illinois' aggressive equal protection stance differs from the feder-
al model, there is no repugnancy. Under the federal supremacy and equal
protection clauses, of course, Illinois courts cannot condone what the United
States Supreme Court condemns.' But the converse is not true; what the
federal courts condone, Illinois courts are free to condemn. Put differently,
in many instances, most notably economic and police power regulations, Illi-
nois courts have properly invoked a more protective standard under the Illi-
nois Constitution. The federal equal protection mode is merely a floor, not a
ceiling. 11
While the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the same standards apply
under the federal and Illinois equal protection clauses,""9 the court has care-
fully noted the subtle yet significant difference in analysis under Illinois'
special legislation prohibition. In a recent decision, Illinois Polygraph Socie-
ty v. Pellicano,15 Justice Clark explained the special legislation-equal protec-
tion distinction in considerable detail:
Special legislation confers a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a
person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situ-
105. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (statutes subject to strict scrutiny are "always or nearly always" struck down); note
17 supra.
106. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
108. Along the same lines, Professor Turkington observed that "[w]hile a state constitution
may expand protection against discrimination beyond that provided by the Federal Constitu-
tion, it may not restrict rights granted by the United States Constitution." Turkington, supra
note 17, at 386 (emphasis in original). See, e.g,, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
- U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 715, 722 n.6 (1981) (state court may apply a more stringent
standard of review as a matter of state law under the state's equivalent to the equal protection or
due process clauses); Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App.3d 994, 1008, 411 N.E.2d 50, 60
(5th Dist. 1980) (Harrison, J., dissenting) (state constitution can guarantee more expansive rights
than the federal constitution).
109. See Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d 116, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980); S.
Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin, 61 Ill. 2d 70, 329 N.E.2d 213 (1975).
110. 83 Ill. 2d 130, 414 N.E.2d 458 (1980).
[Vol. 30:263
1981] A CONTRAST IN UNEQUAL TREATMENT 281
ated. . . . It arbitrarily, and without a sound, reasonable basis, discrimi-
nates in favor of a select group. . . . Special legislation differs from a
violation of equal protection in that the latter consists of arbitrary and
invidious discrimination against a person or class of persons. It results from
the governmental withholding of a right, privilege or benefit from a
person or a class of persons without a reasonable basis (or, where a
fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, a compelling State
interest) for doing so. Whether a law is attacked as special legislation or as
violative of equal protection, it is still the duty of the courts to decide
whether the classification is unreasonable in that it preferentially and
arbitrarily includes a class (special legislation) to the exclusion of all
others, or improperly denies a benefit to a class (equal protection) ...
While certain pieces of legislation may be attacked as both special legisla-
tion and violative of equal protection since they confer a benefit on one
class while denying a benefit to another, there will be many cases where a
benefit is conferred on one class to which no other class has a right. In
those cases, legislation would be attacked as special legislation but not as
violative of equal protection."'
Justice Clark's distinctions between equal protection and special legislation
claims follow the traditional judicial trail landmarked in Grace and once
again demonstrate Illinois' special concern for safeguarding the concept of
even-handedness in legislative schemes. A number of fairly recent decisions
preceding Pellicano, however, have strayed from the well-marked Grace
path and have blurred the equal protection-special legislation contrast.
1 2
One of these unfortunate deviations, just two months before Pellicano,
prompted Justice Kluczynski to dissent and remark that:
The majority's failure to recognize that the amendment before us is special
legislation can only be attributed to its faulty perception of the court's role
in addressing attacks made under the special legislation provisions of our
constitution and its erroneous belief that a special legislation challenge is
foreclosed by an unsuccessful equal protection attack.'3
DEVIATIONS FROM THE GRACE TRAIL-AND RErURN
Justice Kluczynski's sharp dissent in Illinois Housing Development Author-
ity v. Van Meter" 4 addresses the troublesome inconsistency that has plagued
recent Illinois Supreme Court equal protection decisions. These questionable
111. Id. at 137-38, 414 N.E.2d at 462-63 (emphasis added and in original).
112. See, e.g., Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 I11. 2d 116, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980);
Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Il. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v.
Walsh, 67 111. 2d 413, 367 N.E.2d 1325 (1977).
113. Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 Ill.2d 116, 127, 412 N.E.2d 151, 156 (Klu-
czynski, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
114. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
opinions depart from the traditional Grace analysis and ignore or overlook
the constitutionally mandated "reverse deference" from legislature to judici-
ary. Particularly distressing is the high court's recent tendency to assume that
the same standards apply under the Illinois equal protection and special
legislation clauses when previous decisions consistently applied differ-
ent standards. In addition to confusing equal protection with special legisla-
tion, the supreme court in other recent decisions has expressed equal protec-
tion in terms so lax and contradictory as to render the concept virtually
meaningless.
The Van Meter decision is the most patent aberration because it was deliv-
ered only weeks before Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano."5 In Van
Meter, an amendment to the Illinois Housing Development Act", sought to
alleviate serious housing shortages facing low and moderate income families
by raising low interest mortgage funds through municipal bond sales." 7
The amendment contained a provision requiring eligible lending institutions
to restrict low interest mortgage loans to "persons in families who have never
owned a single family home or condominium.""' Pursuant to the amend-
ment, the Authority adopted a resolution authorizing a $50 million bond
issue and directing its chairman, Van Meter, to execute the bonds and
publish notice of their sale." 9 Van Meter refused to do either, claiming that
the loan restriction to "first time" homeowners violated the equal protection
clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions as well as Illinois'
special legislation prohibition.12 0  In an obvious "test case," the Authority
sought a writ of mandamus to compel Van Meter to perform his duties,
which the circuit court granted.
On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the equal protec-
tion claims according to the federal mode. The court found that the amend-
ment neither operated to the disadvantage of a suspect class nor infringed
upon a fundamental right. 12 ' Responding to the argument that the amend-
ment nevertheless created a suspect classification based on wealth that
"should trigger a review under a strict-scrutiny standard,"12 the high court
115. 83 I11. 2d 130, 414 N.E.2d 458 (1980). Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 I11. 2d
116, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980), was decided on October 10, 1980. Approximately seven weeks later,
on December 1, 1980, Pellicano was decided, not even citing Van Meter, although they both
addressed the applicability of the Illinois special legislation prohibition.
116. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 671/2, §§ 301-334 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
117. The amendment at issue in Van Meter provided in part:
(b) The Authority may have outstanding at any one time bonds and notes in an
aggregate principal amount ...which ... amount shall be used solely for the
purposes of making loans to lending institutions ...for use by such institutions in
making residential mortgage loans where the proposed owner-occupant ... has
never previously owned a single family home or condominium.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67V2, § 322(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
118. Id.
119. 82 I11. 2d at 119, 412 N.E.2d at 152,
120. id.
121. Id. at 121, 412 N.E.2d at 153.
122. Id. at 120, 412 N.E.2d at 153.
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instead chose to apply the lesser standard of "rational relationship. ' 12 3 As
authority for its minimal scrutiny approach, the Van Meter court cited San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,1 2 4 a United States Su-
preme Court decision that the Illinois Supreme Court read as holding that
"such wealth classifications [are] regulations concerning economic and social
welfare policy that do not merit active judicial review under the strict
scrutiny or compelling interest standards."' 2 5
Since wealth did not constitute a suspect classification under the federal
approach and since the Van Meter court rejected the notion that housing was
a fundamental right,"'126 the Van Meter majority had no difficulty discerning
the amendment's "rational relationship to a legitimate legislative pur-
pose.' 2 7  The legislative classsification limiting low interest loans to "first-
time buyers" was presumed valid, even though the court recognized that
"the amendment may exclude certain non-first-time purchasers who are in
greater financial need than some first time home buyers."' 1 8 Such under-in-
clusion was justified by the familiar Illinois equal protection principle that a
statutory classification is not required to be "accurate, scientific or harmo-
nious so long as it is not arbitrary and will accomplish the legislative de-
sign. '" 1 2  The Van Meter majority then dispatched the special legislation
argument by concluding that the "same standards appl[y] in both Federal
and State equal protection analyses . . .to determine violations of the special
legislation provision of the Illinois Constitution."' 130
The Van Meter majority's analysis is flawed on two significant grounds.
First, it completely overlooked United States Supreme Court decisions since
San Antonio Independent School District where the High Court adopted
several intermediate levels of scrutiny between the upper and lower tiers. 13
123. The court stated: "We hold in the instant case that a wealth classification infringing on a
person's right to housing, a nonfundamental right, should be examined under a rational-
relationship standard of review." Id. at 121, 412 N.E.2d at 153.
124. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
125. 82 Ill. 2d at 120, 412 N.E.2d at 153.
126. Id. at 121, 412 N.E.2d at 153 (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971),
and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974)). In Valtierra, the Supreme Court
sustained a provision in the California Constitution that any "low rent" housing project had to
be approved by local referendum. An almost identical provision in the City of Akron (Ohio)
charter was struck down as violative of equal protection in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969). The rationale in Hunter was that it involved race whereas in Valtierra the discrimination
was allegedly based on wealth.
127. Utilizing the rational relationship test, the court held that "the statutory classification of
the amendment bears a rational relationship to the legitimate legislative purpose of providing
financing for housing to low- and moderate-income families." 82 Ill. 2d at 124, 412 N.E.2d at
154.
128. 82 I11. 2d at 123, 412 N.E.2d at 154.
129. Id. (citing People v. Valdez, 79 Ill. 2d 74, 83-84, 402 N.E.2d 187, 192 (1980), and
Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 Ill. 2d 499, 512, 349 N.E.2d 61, 68 (1976)).
130. 82 Ill.2d at 124, 412 N.E.2d at 155. Cf. Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d
474 (1972). Justice Schaefer, writing for the court, stated: "While these two provisions of the
1970 constitution [art. I, § 2 and art. IV, § 13] cover much of the same terrain, they are not
duplicates ... ". " Id. at 487, 283 N.E.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
131. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
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The Supreme Court has usually tested wealth classifications by the
"toothless" ' minimum rationality standard, but it has not always relegated
poverty discrimination to the minimal scrutiny approach. 133 In fact,
although recent Supreme Court decisions have applied a "heightened stan-
dard of even-handedness" ' to certain poverty classifications, none of these
cases were cited by the Van Meter majority. Thus, Van Meter's analysis of
the federal and state equal protection clauses' impact on wealth classifica-
tions is questionable because it follows the federal approach, yet fails to
consider the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on
the topic.
A far more serious mistake, however, is the Van Meter majority's remark
that the same standards apply to challenges under Illinois' special legislation
and equal protection clauses. 3 ' As Justice Kluczynski's dissent pointed out,
there is a significant difference between these standards of review. He noted
that "[w]hile an equal protection analysis may not suffice to expose the invid-
ious nature of. . . legislative action, the special legislation clause. . . none-
theless provides a means by which more meaningful judicial review can be
undertaken ... ,"136 Furthermore, Justice Schaefer's well-reasoned opinion
in Grace v. Howlett,1 37 in which he clearly distinguished equal protection
from special legislation, specifically admonished the high court against abdi-
cating its constitutional responsibility to determine "whether a general law
can be made applicable" in special legislation cases. 138  By confusing equal
protection and special legislation standards, the Van Meter majority sharply
departs from Illinois tradition and more than merits Justice Kluczynski's
criticism that their recent special legislation pronouncements and case law
analysis "are indefensible.' 139
Van Meter's shortcomings can perhaps be explained on practical rather
than theoretical grounds. After all, to some extent the high court must rely
upon opposing counsels' presentations, and the friendly confrontation be-
tween the Authority and its chairman in Van Meter had all the adversarial
132. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) ($25 Oregon appellate court filing fee
not violative of equal protection because requirement of rationality has been met); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state has legitimate interest in encouraging employment and
avoiding discrimination between welfare families; therefore Maryland's maximum grant ceiling
on family welfare benefits held not violative of equal protection).
133. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has applied a higher standard of rationality
in certain poverty discrimination cases. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) (congressional amendment to Federal Food Stamp Act denying assistance to
households including one or more unrelated members stricken as violative of equal protection
clause); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (invalidating provision
in Federal Food Stamp Act excluding any member of eligible household over 18 years of age
who had been claimed in prior, year as dependent on federal income tax return).
134. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 117.
135. 82 I11. 2d at 124, 412 N.E.2d at 155.
136. Id. at 125-26, 412 N.E.2d at 155 (Kluczynski, J., dissenting).
137. 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
138. Id. at 487, 283 N.E.2d at 479.
139. 82 Ill. 2d at 128, 412 N.E.2d at 156 (Kluczynski, J., dissenting).
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quality of playing tennis without a net. This problem is apparent in the
court's treatment of Van Meter's argument that a homeowner purchasing
another home is not necessarily in a better financial position than a first-time
buyer. Because defendant Van Meter presented neither "any factual basis
nor any legal authority to support this [argument],' 14° the court found it
convenient to conclude that "the unsupported opinions of the defendant are
insufficient to overcome the presumption that the law :is constitutional. '" 1 4
It is possible, then, that counsels' limited presentation of the issues may
explain the Van Meter court's misguided analysis.
The Van Meter decision's divergence from Illinois' traditional technique
for distinguishing equal protection from special legislation cases was fore-
shadowed in several preceding supreme court opinions. The first, Friedman
& Rochester v. Walsh, 42 involved a challenge to a provision of the Illinois
Pension Code 43 that immunized from garnishment or attachment pensions
and annuities paid from the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund. 144  A
creditor of a fireman's beneficiary attacked the firemen's exemption as vio-
lating federal equal protection as well as the Illinois Constitution's equal
protection and special legislation clauses because private pensions were not
similarly immune from creditor claims.
Without verbalizing the degree of scrutiny it applied, the Walsh court
rejected the equal protection arguments on familiar grounds. The decision
simply stated that the federal and state constitutions neither "prohibit the
establishment of legislative classifications . . . nor . . . require that all per-
sons be treated uniformly." '14  The legislative classification exempting fire-
men pensions "enjoy[ed] a presumption of constitutionality"'' 46 and could be
sustained "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. "'47
The court then noted numerous distinctions between public and private
pensions 48 that could justify the statutory exemption for firemen, and there-
140. Id. at 122, 412 N.E.2d at 154. The Congressional Budget Office Report, relied upon by
the majority in Van Meter, was also cited by the dissent as showing that "[tihe fact of previous
ownership at some point in the individual's lifetime, does not ipso facto establish a preferred
financial status." Id. at 126, 412 N.E.2d at 156 (Kluczynski, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 122, 412 N.E.2d at 154 (emphasis added).
142. 67 I11. 2d 413, 367 N.E.2d 1325 (1977).
143. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 108/2 (1975).
144. The section of the Illinois Pension Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1081/2 §§ 1-101 to
24-107 (1975), challenged in Walsh, was a revision and codification of the various acts relating
to pension and annuity funds for public employees. The Code exempted all pensions, annuities,
and benefits from the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund from attachment or garnishment
process. Specifically, § 6-213 was attacked. It read in pertinent part: "All pensions, annuities,
refunds and disability benefits granted under this Article and every portion thereof, are exempt
from attachment or garnishment process." Id. § 6-213.
145. 67 I11. 2d at 418, 367 N.E.2d at 1327.
146. Id. at 419, 367 N.E.2d at 1327.
147. Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), and quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)).
148. After rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the immunity From garnishment and at-
tachment granted by § 6-213 of the Pension Code must be struck down because a similar
1981]
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fore concluded that the challenged classification was not arbitrary or
unreasonable.' Similarly, the statute's failure to exempt pension funds for
policemen from small municipalities '" was upheld because the federal and
state equal protection clauses "do not prohibit the legislature from pursuing
a reform 'one step at a time' or applying a remedy to one selected phase of a
field while neglecting others.""'
The Walsh court disposed of the special legislation claim by asserting that
"[t]his Court has stated that violations of the special legislation prohibition
are generally judged by the same standards employed under the equal pro-
tection clause . . . though the provisions are not duplicates." 52 Ironically,
the Walsh court cited Grace v. Howlett as authority for this statement when,
in fact, Grace explained in some detail that the same standards do not
apply. " Although the Walsh court acknowledged that the 1970 Constitution
enlarged the scope of judicial review, it asserted that the constitution did
not change the definition of special legislation, 5- even though the Grace de-
cision had held virtually the opposite.' Finally, by claiming that "one step
at a time" reform was permissible under equal protection and that the same
standards apply to special legislation, the Walsh court adopted a position
forcefully rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in Grace.57 In short, the
special legislation standards announced in Grace, if consistently applied in
Walsh, should have invalidated the crazy-quilt exemptions and non-
exemptions in the pension code.
The second decision presaging Van Meter was Anderson v. Wagner.""
The challenged provision in Wagner established a special limitations period
for medical malpractice actions against physicians and hospitals. 59 Plain-
exemption was not granted to recipients of private pensions, the Walsh court outlined the
distinctions between private and public pension funds. The court stated:
Pensions for public employees are primarily supported by public funds. The legisla-
ture could reasonably have felt that these public funds should go entirely to the
beneficiary and not to his creditors through garnishment or wage deductions. The
legislature may also have concluded that public pensions are subject to certain
statutory limitations and restrictions that do not apply to private pension funds, thus
justifying conferring an immunity from garnishment on the payments made from
the public pension funds.
Id. at 419-20, 367 N.E.2d at 1327-28.
149. Id. at 420, 367 N.E.2d at 1328.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1081/2, §§ 3-101 to -150 (1975).
151. 67 11. 2d at 421, 367 N.E.2d at 1328.
152. Id. at 422, 367 N.E.2d at 1329 (emphasis added).
153. 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
154. See notes 93-100 and accompanying text supra.
155. 67 Ill. 2d at 422, 367 N.E.2d at 1329.
156. Although the Grace court noted that the definition remained the same, it emphasized
that the 1970 Constitution had changed the court's role into one of intervention for determining
whether a general law is or can be made applicable under § 13 of art. IV. 51 11. 2d at 487, 283
N.E.2d at 479.
157. 51 111. 2d at 487, 283 N.E.2d at 479. See text at note 98 supra.
158. 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979).
159. The challenged statute provided:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician or hospital . . .
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tiffs contended that the medical malpractice limitations period violated Illi-
nois' special legislation prohibition because there was no reason for classify-
ing physicians and hospitals differently than other tortfeasors covered by the
general provisions of the Limitations Act.1 0
Relying upon federal equal protection analysis and distinguishing prior
Illinois cases, the Wagner court found the special malpractice limitations
period a reasonable classification. "6 It also noted that the constitutional ban
on special legislation did not preclude the legislature from "classiftying] per-
sons and objects," 162 and thus dismissed the special legislation challenge.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court had held a similar special limitations
period for architects and contractors unconstitutional as special legislation in
Skinner v. Anderson," the Wagner court concluded that Skinner was not
controlling 164 and upheld the manifestly arbitrary classification favoring doc-
tors and hospitals.
Wagner cannot plausibly be squared with either the method or result of
Skinner. Skinner viewed the shorter limitations period for architects and
contractors as unconstitutional special legislation because the court en-
visioned situations where injuries resulting from improved property could
result in suits against manufacturers but not against contractors or
architects. 115 The Skinner court found no justification for such disparate
treatment of joint tortfeasors,'6 unlike the court in Wagner. Yet, the Wagner
statute also failed to shorten the limitations period for all potential joint tort-
feasors in medical malpractice actions by covering only physicians and hos-
pitals but not other personnel or health care facilities.16 Thus, even though
Skinner and Wagner involved the same issue, they reached opposite results.
whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient
care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, . . . whichever of
such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4
years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in
such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1977).
160. 79 Ill. 2d at 301, 402 N.E.2d at 562. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch, 83, §§ 13-27 (1979).
161. 79 I11. 2d at 318-19, 402 N.E.2d at 571.
162. Id. at 320, 402 N.E.2d at 572.
163. 38 I11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
164. 79 Ill. 2d at 320, 402 N.E.2d at 572.
165. In discussing the validity of the applicable statute, the Skinner court stated:
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly appears when we consider that architects
and contractors are not the only persons whose negligence in the construction of a
building or other improvement may cause damage to property or injury to persons.
If, for example, four years after a building is completed a cornice should fall because
the adhesive used was defective, the manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no
immunity .... But if the cornice fell because of defective design or construction for
which an architect or contractor was responsible, immunity is granted.
38 111. 2d at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591.
166. Id. at 460-61, 231 N.E.2d at 591.
167. See note 159 supra.
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Yet another precursor to Van Meter was Fujimura v. Chicago Transit
Authority,'6 8 where the supreme court sustained a six month notice of claim
period and a one year statute of limitations for personal injury suits against
the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). These provisions in the Metropolitan
Transit Authority Act,16 9 under which the CTA was created, were chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds by Fujimura and others because the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Tort Immunity Act)170 established a one year notice of claim period and a
two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions against other
governmental entities. The circuit court agreed and held the special CTA
statute's provisions unconstitutional.17 1
Reviewing the statute on appeal, the supreme court applied "traditional"
equal protection analysis by noting that the CTA provisions had to bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 72  The Fujimura court
admitted that the CTA was a public entity, but emphasized that the CTA's
unique function and activities distinguished it from other governmental en-
tities for purposes of shorter notice of claim and statute of limitations
periods.' The court explained that "classifications of governmental entities
based upon their functions and activities are frequently made, and the CTA
function is not the only one treated differently from others." '"' After noting
that the legislature may properly distinguish between public and private
tortfeasors, the Fujimura court then cited numerous provisions of the Tort
168. 67 Il. 2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977).
169. The Act provides:
Within six (6) months from the date that such an injury was received or such cause of
action accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action in any court
against the Authority for damages on account of any injury to his person shall file in
the office of the secretary of the Board and also in the office of the General Attorney
for the Authority ... a statement, in writing, signed by himself .... If the notice
provided for by this section is not filed as provided, any such civil action commenced
against the Authority shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of
action accrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from further suing.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1112/3, § 341 (1973).
170. The Tort Immunity Act is the common name for the Local Governmental and Govern-
mental Employees Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT ch. 85, §§ 8-101 to -103 (1973). In
relevant part, section 8-102 provides:
Within 1 year from the date that the injury or cause of action, referred to in
Sections 8-101, 8-102 and 8-103, was received or accrued, any person who is about
to commence any civil action for damages on account of such injury against a local
public entity, or against any of its employees ... must serve ... a written notice on
the Secretary or Clerk as the case may be, for the entity against whom or against
whose employee the action is contemplated ....
ILL. REv. STAT. CH. 85, § 8-102 (1973).
171. 67 I11. 2d at 507, 368 N.E.2d at 105.
172. Id. at 512, 368 N.E. 2d at 107.
173. Id. at 513-16, 368 N.E.2d at 108-10.
174. Id. at 514, 368 N.E.2d at 109.
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Immunity Act that imposed liability only in certain instances or established
varying pre-suit notice restrictions. 5  In light of these differences, the court
concluded that the special provisions of the CTA statute were neither un-
reasonable nor arbitrary because the CTA's immense size and unique prob-
lems justified different treatment.171
Oddly enough, the Fujimura court claimed support for its decision could
be found in Harvey v. Clyde Park District,17 an earlier case where the Illi-
nois Supreme Court had struck down a statute that purported to establish
tort immunity for park districts but failed to protect other governmental
units. 78  The Harvey court invalidated the park district immunity statute on
special legislation grounds, noting that "[m]ore is involved here than just the
classification of governmental units. Those persons who are injured by the
negligence of particular governmental units are also classified, and [the Illi-
nois Constitution's special legislation restriction] prohibits the granting of
Ispecial or exclusive' privileges to individuals." 'v" The statute was arbitrary
in the court's view because "[f]rom the perspective of the injured party, ...
there is no reason why one who is injured by a park district truck should be
barred from recovery while one who is injured by a city or village truck is
allowed to recover .... . "'" Permitting or denying recovery on an arbitrary
basis was the effect of the park district statute, which was impermissible
under the special legislation prohibition's strict rationality standard.'
The parallel between Harvey and Fujimura is striking. Although there
may be differences between the CTA and other governmental entities, from
175. Id. at 514-15, 368 N.E.2d at 109. The court observed that the Tort Immunity Act
provides for limited liability for police activities (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 4-101 to -107 (1973))
and fire protection (Id. § 5-101 to -103). The court also noted that in certain situations the
Illinois Municipal Code will impose absolute liability on a municipality for injuries suffered by a
person assisting a police officer. (Id. ch. 24, §§ 1-4-5 to -6), although there are no similar statutes
imposing liability for damages incurred while assisting other public employees.
More importantly, the court recognized that suits for damages for the wrongful removal,
destruction, or vacation of a building require no notice (Id. ch. 24, § 1-4-7). Also, the Worker's
Compensation Act requires a 45-day notice (Id. ch. 48, § 138.6(c)). Finally, the court noted that
actions against different regional park districts require six months notice (Id. ch. 19, §§ 545, 634,
784,844).
176. 67 11. 2d at 513, 516, 368 N.E.2d at 108, 109-10.
177. 32 I1. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
178. Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577. The statute considered by the court provided in relevant
part:
Any park district shall not be liable for any injuries to person or property, or for the
death of any person heretofore or hereafter caused by or resulting from the negli-
gence of its agents, servants, officers or employees in the operation or maintenance
of any property, equipment or facility under the jurisdiction, control or custody of
the park district or otherwise occasioned by the acts or conduct of such agents,
servants, officers or employees.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105 § 12.1-1 (1963).
179. 32 I11. 2d 65, 203 N.E.2d 576.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
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the perspective of the person injured by a CTA bus those differences are
totally irrelevant. Whether crushed by a CTA bus or a City of Chicago
garbage truck, the victim has suffered the same injury. This was the gist of
the Harvey decision, where the invidious discrimination was the statute's
different impact upon similarly situated tort victims rather than the classifi-
cation between types of public tortfeasors. Thus, even though governmental
units have different functions, it is the similarity of governmental activities
giving rise to tort liability that may be common to all governmental units,
regardless of classification. Equal protection therefore is denied when an
injured person's recovery depends upon the tortfeasor's function, rather than
its conduct. As the Harvey court noted, to the accident victim such differen-
tiation is a mere "fortuitous circumstance" upon which statutory classifica-
tion should not turn.18 2
Although the appellants in Fujimura did not raise the special legislation
prohibition, the statute in Fujimura suffered from the same constitutional
defect as the statutes struck down in Harvey, Grasse v. Dealer's Transport
Co., 83 and Grace v. Howlett. 84 In Grasse, a worker's compensation provi-
sion was invalidated because its attempted classification of tortfeasors re-
sulted in disparate treatment of similarly situated tort victims. Relying upon
Grasse, the Harvey court struck down a tort immunity statute because it
purported to classify governmental units by function but allowed different
treatment of similarly situated tort victims. Relying upon both Grasse and
Harvey, the Grace court held unconstitutional a no-fault insurance statute
because it classified tortfeasors but once again treated similarly situated tort
victims differently.
Grasse, Harvey, and Grace all followed traditional special legislation
analysis by not tolerating statutory arbitrariness that conditioned tort vic-
tims' recovery upon fortuitous circumstances. The same result should have
been obtained in Fujimura because the pre-suit notice requirement favoring
the CTA caused similarly situated tort victims to experience different treat-
ment depending solely upon which governmental tortfeasor injured them.
Just like Van Meter, Fujinura deviated from traditional Illinois analysis by
sanctioning an arbitrary statutory classification clearly at odds with the
special legislation prohibition's strict rationality standard.
In light of Walsh, Wagner, and Fujimura, Van Meter appeared to signal a
new special legislation approach that differed greatly from the landmark
Grace decision. But less than two months after Van Meter, as if responding
to Mr. Justice Kluczynski's jeremiad, the Illinois Supreme Court in Illinois
Polygraph Society v. Pellicano carefully noted that there is indeed a disposi-
tive difference between equal protection and special legislation. 18 5  The
Pellicano court's exhaustive examination of the two doctrines, however,
182. Id. at 66, 203 N.E.2d at 576.
183. 412 Ill. 2d 179, 106 N.E.2d 124, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). For a discussion of
the Grasse decision see notes 69-76 and accompanying text supra.
184. 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). For a discussion of the Grace decision see notes
91-99 and accompanying text supra.
185. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
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somehow overlooked Van Meter, its most recent prior pronouncement on the
subject.
Despite its failure to address Van Meter, Pellicano represents an en-
couraging return to the main line established in Grace. Rather than abdicate
its judical responsibility, the Pellicano court forthrightly faced the issues of
"reasonableness" and "special legislation." By distinguishing previous deci-
sions covering similar licensing laws, the Pellicano court engaged in
meaningful judicial review consistent with both its constitutional mandate
under the special legislation prohibition' and with its holding in Grace. Most
importantly, the court was not detoured by the route of simple deference to
legislative judgment.
In view of the Pelicano decision's return to the traditional Illinois ap-
proach, Walsh, Wagner, Fujimura, and Van Meter should be considered
aberrant opinions. In those cases, the supreme court consciously muted the
difference between equal protection and special legislation, as in Walsh,
absently overemphasized the similarity between the two types of claims at
the expense of their differences, as in Van Meter, or simply overlooked the
special legislation clause altogether, as in Fujimura. The scholarly discussion
of federal and Illinois equal protection in Wagner should be viewed as sim-
ply an elaborate rationalization for reaching the desired result of alleviating
the perceived insurance crisis in medical malpractice coverage, which was
the Wagner statute's purpose. In all four cases, the court misconceived its
role by deferring to legislative judgment when it was faced with clearly
invidious classifications or blatantly special legislation.
Although the Illinois Constitution's equal protection and special legislation
clauses "cover much of the same terrain," quite clearly they are not one and
the same. They impose distinctly different judicial duties based upon differ-
ent historical purposes. Equal protection requires deference to legislative
judgment, but not to arbitrary or unreasonable classifications. The special
legislation prohibition, on the other hand, mandates reverse deference from
legislature to judiciary by expressly empowering the judiciary to determine
whether a general law can be made applicable. Overlapping similarities
between these two types of claims should not, on that account, arbitrarily
obliterate or obscure crucial differences. Van Meter, Walsh, Wagner, and
Fujimura are unfortunate departures from the mainstream; Pellicano repre-
sents an encouraging return.
STRAYING FROM THE PATH AGAIN?
More recently, the supreme court's language in People ex rel. Difanis v.
Barr" created a problem equally pressing but somewhat different from the
confusion over the equal protection-special legislation distinction. Although
Barr did not stray from the traditional Illinois equal protection-special leg-
islation reasoning, that court was needlessly careless in expressing equal pro-
tection doctrine and the operative standards. In holding that the General
186. 83 111. 2d 191, 414 N.E.2d 731 (1980).
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Assembly's exemption of itself from the Open Meetings Act s 7 did not violate
equal protection or special legislation restrictions, the Barr court said that
"[u]nder the well-established standards regarding equal protection of the
laws, the legislature may differentiate between persons similarly
situated ... "188
On its face, this unqualified statement is self-contradictory, nugatory of
equal protection under almost any circumstances, and therefore non-
sensical. The legislature may classify and treat those different classes dif-
ferently. But the very purpose of equal protection is to guarantee that per-
sons similarly situated are not treated differently. 8 Cited as support for the
Barr proposition, however, was Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,' ° which did
enunciate a similarly worded rule: "the legislature may differentiate between
persons similarly situated as long as the classification bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate legislative purpose." "' But unlike the quote from
Barr, the Kujawinski assertion added the significant qualification that legisla-
tive differentiation be reasonably related to legitimate legislative purposes.
By inaccurately paraphrasing Kujawinski, the Barr court drastically, though
perhaps unintentionally, altered equal protection standards.
The same tendency to imprecisely paraphrase was demonstrated by Kuja-
winski. As authority for the Kujawinski proposition, McGowan v. Mary-
land 92 is cited, complete with page references. Tracing to the McGowan
citation, however, reveals nothing even remotely close to the Kujawin-
ski statement of the rule. The page in McGowan credited as the source for
the Kujawinski statement contains only the following discussion:
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion
in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. The constitutional safeguard is only offended if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitu-
tional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
187. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 41 (1979). Section 2 of the Open Meetings Act provides that
the meetings of the General Assembly or its committees or commissions are not required to be
public meetings. Id. § 42. Section 1 of the Open Meetings Act states:
It is the public policy of this state that the public commissions, committees, boards
and councils and the other public agencies of this state exist to aid in the conduct of
the people's business. It is the intent of this Act that their actions be taken openly and
that their deliberations be conducted openly.
Id. § 41.
188. 83 Ill. 2d 204, 414 N.E.2d 736 (emphasis added).
189. See, e.g., People v. Nicholson, 401 I11. 546, 82 N.E.2d 656 (1948); Schreiber v. Cook
County, 388 I11. 297, 58 N.E.2d 40 (1945); Lipman v. Goebel, 356 I11. 315, 192 N.E. 203
(1934); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 3, at 344.
190. 71 111. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
191. Id. at 578, 376 N.E.2d at 1389.
192. 366 U.S. 420 (1966).
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inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it .... 1
The McGowan pronouncement of equal protection standards in no way
resembles the disfigured version presented in Barr and Kujawinski. To trans-
mute the McGowan formulation into the Barr rule that "the legislature may
differentiate between persons similarly situated" is to transgress the limits of
the license to paraphrase. If the bare statement in Barr is to be the governing
standard of Illinois equal protection, then "equal protection of the laws" is
an empty phrase and any claim thereunder is foredoomed to failure. Al-
though the McGowan rule is indeed a relaxed standard, 19 4 it is not the utterly
worthless pronouncement found in Barr. Yet, the damage is now done
because a number of subsequent Illinois opinions have relied upon the Kuja-
winski formulation. 95 If this serious misstatement of the law is not soon
corrected, future equal protection decisions may blindly quote a paraphrase
of a non-existent Supreme Court test.
CONCLUSION
For reasons special to the Illinois Constitution and its history, equal pro-
tection claims in Illinois have always received judicial attention beyond that
of the federal model. While many economic, property, and police power
classifications have survived the federal system's "minimum rationality"
standard, comparable statutes and ordinances often have been struck down
by Illinois courts because Illinois' "rationality" test has been strictly applied.
The Illinois tradition has been further strengthened by the 1970 Constitu-
tion's explicit equal protection clause, its cluster of equal protection-type
provisions forbidding gender, employment, and handicap discrimination,
and its re-adoption of the long-standing prohibition against special legisla-
tion. Significantly, even that well-established proscription was fortified with
a new proviso that the judiciary, not the legislature, shall determine when a
general law is or can be made applicable.
Because the Illinois Supreme Court in Grace v. Howlett recognized that
its constitutional responsibility to invalidate special legislation is derived
from and enlarged by the new Illinois Constitution, judicial deference to
legislative judgment should be minimal. The 1970 Constitution mandated a
more activist judicial role in equal protection confrontations-a role not
accepted in cases like Wagner, Walsh, Fujimura, and Van Meter. Such
abdications of the judiciary's responsibility to invalidate unreasonable statu-
tory classifications are a disservice to, rather than a preservation of, the
193. Id. at 425-26.
194. The McGowan discussion is an elaborate expression of the lower tier's minimum
rationality standard, traditionally a relaxed test. Id. at 425-28.
195. See Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12 (1980). See also In re Marriage of
Thompson, 79 111. App. 3d 310, 398 N.E.2d 17 (1st Dist. 1979); In re Marriage of Thornquist, 79
Ill. App. 3d 791; 399 N.E.2d 176 (1st Dist. 1979).
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separation of powers doctrine. Fortunately, Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pel-
licano halts this trend.
Apart from returning to its activist role required by the Illinois Constitu-
tion, the supreme court must exercise greater care in expressing equal pro-
tection doctrine and standards of review. The inaccurate paraphrasing that
occurred in Barr and Kujawinski resulted in the meaningless proposition
that the legislature may differentiate between similarly situated persons.
Without any qualification, this statement on its face undercuts equal protec-
tion under almost any circumstances. In the future, the Illinois Supreme
Court should take care to note that the legislature may differentiate between
similarly situated persons only in limited contexts and only with acceptable
reasons.
To borrow Professor Gunther's words, Illinois courts "can and should en-
gage in more serious, less deferential review in order to assure that legisla-
tive means generally promote articulated governmental . . . purposes." 9
Increased consciousness of Illinois' unique equal protection tradition will
alert Illinois courts to the federal model's limitations and encourage more
meaningful review of legislation under the Illinois Constitution's stricter
standards.
196. GUNTHER, supra note 7, at 689.
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